Cascading Events, Technology and the Floods Directive: future challenges by Pescaroli, G & Nones, M
a
 Corresponding author: nones@gerstgraser.de  
Cascading Events, Technology and the Floods Directive: future 
challenges 
Gianluca Pescaroli1, Michael Nones2,a  
1Institute for Risk and Disaster Prevention, University College London, Gower Street, WC1E 6BT, London, United Kingdom 
2gerstgraser - Ingenieurbüro für Renaturierung, An der Pastoa 13, 03042, Cottbus, Germany 
Abstract. Cascading events can be referred to multidimensional disasters, where a primary trigger generates a non-
linear series of secondary emergencies that escalate in time, becoming eventually the priority to tackle. In this 
process, critical infrastructure can be handled as roots of vulnerabilities, because they accumulate both physical 
attributes and functional nodes. When compromised, they produce widespread breakdowns of society, but also orient 
emergency responses and long-term recovery. Although floods have been widely associated to the failure of 
vulnerable equipments or to the disruption of strategic sectors such as energy, communication and transportation, 
their integration with the emerging concept of cascading has been limited. This open topic presents many challenges 
for scholars, researchers and practitioners, in particular when the implementation of the EU Floods Directive is 
considered. The paper presents an overview of the Floods Directive and its relation with the cascading events, using 
case studies and examples from the existing literature to point out missing links and gaps in the legislation. 
Conclusions argue that the Directive considers only local geographical scales and limited temporal horizons, which 
can be result inadequate to limit the escalation of events.  
1 Introduction  
Floods are considered one of the most critical 
categories of disaster in Europe for their wide and strong 
recurrence. Over the period 19862006, it has caused 
estimated damages for over 100 billion euro [1, 2]. The 
potential impact of the phenomena is not only related to 
environmental (natural) causes, but has also consistent 
anthropic roots. In the recent decades, economic and 
insured losses associated with flooding events have 
drastically increased for their correlation to socio-
economic drivers and political decisions, such as 
strategies of spatial planning or land use management [3, 
4].  Despite the adoption of new mitigation measures, it is 
probable that the trend will continue for the future. 
Indeed, on the one hand flood-prone areas remain 
attractive for human activities and the higher consume of 
land is likely to increase the damage potential in the near 
future [1]. On the other hand, it is known that the 
frequency and magnitude of flooding events may increase 
because of climate change patterns exacerbated by 
industrial process and urban pollution [5, 6, 7]. 
Even though the areas at risk of floods are often well- 
known, preparedness levels can be still scarce because of 
a hierarchical and sectorial planning mentality prevailed 
for a long time. Flood defense policies had different 
phases since the Second World War, but the emphasis on 
non-structural measures becomes prominent only starting 
from the early nineties [8]. Nowadays, it is unequivocal 
that the positive impact of technological advances 
depends also by forms of inclusive governance that could 
overcome risk denial, increase the trust in public agencies 
and improve communications [9]. This process is far 
from being linear and different authors explained that, 
even if warning strategies improved since the early 
2000s, in some cases they may be still missing the right 
approach to inform, train and involve water managers and 
citizens [10]. A recurrent limitation is represented by the 
integration of top-down and bottom-up approaches, 
which are often considered only after major disasters, 
when preparedness measures become a shared priority 
among all the stakeholders [11]. Similarly, it is known 
that robustness and flexibility criteria have been not 
implemented in governance, but are necessary for 
adapting to long-term environmental changes [12]. As 
uncertainty dominates future scenarios, decision makers 
are required to maximize performances by considering 
the local sensibility to multiple technological and 
environmental hazards. However, despite many 
improvements, there are still gaps in the legislation that 
should support a comprehensive management of risks 
[13, 14, 15]. For example, the evolution of tools and the 
choice of political portfolio have been oriented by long-
term social backgrounds that are different among 
countries [16].  
In the European Union, some recurrent failures have 
been found in addressing cross-scale vulnerabilities, such 
as in the case of communication and cooperation across 
administrative borders that may result in conflicts 
between upstream and downstream communities [11]. 
The implementation of the European Directive on the 
Assessment and Management of Flood Risks [17], 

 
 
 
 
 
DOI: 10.1051/07003 (2016), 6E3S Web of Conferences e3sconf/201
FLOODrisk 2016 - 3rd European Conference on Flood Risk Management 
7 0707003
 © The Authors,  published  by EDP Sciences.  This  is  an  open  access  article  distributed  under  the  terms  of  the Creative  Commons Attribution
 License 4.0 (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). 
hereafter called Floods Directive (FD), directly reflects 
those problems: although the jurisdiction of the 
Community is filled by a very substantial amount of 
transboundary water systems, more uniformity in flood 
risks assessment and mapping is still needed [18]. The 
application of the emerging concept of cascading events 
proposed by Pescaroli and Alexander [19] could 
represent an additional challenge. In fact, the FD seems 
to be focused on localized impacts, without adequately 
addressing the coordination challenges that could arise in 
the case of cross-scale crisis where cascades are diffused 
[4]. However, many interrogatives remain open, in 
particular regarding likelihoods and features of worst 
case scenarios.  
The paper aims to test the hypothesis that the Floods 
Directive is missing to address the potential escalation of 
events that distinguishes cascading disasters. After an 
introduction about the legislative background of the 
Directive, we present a brief description of cascading 
events and the role of Critical Infrastructures (CI). A 
collection of case studies, spanning from urban floods to 
NaTech events, shows the existing gaps within the FD in 
addressing the cascading effects triggered by flooding 
events. Questions on these issues and their integration 
during the future implementation cycles are discussed 
and presented in the conclusions, as well as the necessity 
of further research. 
2 Directive on the Assessment and the 
Management of Flood Risks  
The European Commission issued a communication 
on flood risk management in 2004, highlighting the need 
for further legal actions to limit the damages caused by 
flooding all over Europe and to improve coordination 
between and within the Member States. A proposal for a 
new Directive was released in 2006, after an intense 
consultation process involving Member States, NGOs, 
scientific community and other stakeholders. Despite that 
it passed through various European institutions, it was 
subjected only to minor modifications and, finally, the 
Directive on the Assessment and Management of Flood 
Risks become into force only 17 months after the first 
reading in the Parliament, on 26 November 2007 [17].  
The core problems that this Directive has to handle 
are: i) floods are natural phenomena that cannot be 
prevented; ii) floods have the potential to cause 
displacement of people, fatalities, environmental and 
economic damages; iii) anthropogenic activities and 
climate change can contribute to increase probabilities 
and adverse impacts of floods; iv) measures to reduce 
flood risks within international river basins should be 
coordinated on a transnational level; v) measures related 
to water or land use changes should be verified for their 
impacts on flood risks [20, 21]. 
However, many challenges are still open. Birkmann et 
al. [22] suggested that the FD and its implementation 
strategy missed the integration of a comprehensive 
approach on vulnerability and proposed the need to apply 
a new framework on the topic. This could be true even 
for cascading events where, according to the model 
developed by Pescaroli and Alexander [23], the Directive 
could reduce potential losses, acting as a mediator of 
cross-scale spreading. Firstly, the reception of lessons 
learned could be jointed with the acknowledgment of new 
risks into new forms of good governance that may 
activate positive feedbacks to attenuate vulnerability and 
environmental losses [24]. Secondly, the 
acknowledgement of coupled natural and anthropogenic 
forcings could be applied at reasonable larger temporal 
and spatial scales to tackle the vulnerability paths existing 
between primary triggers and secondary crises [4]. 
2.1 Legislative background 
The implementation cycle of the FD follows fixed 
deadlines, characterized by three steps regularly updated 
every six years (Figure 1). For the first cycle, these steps 
were: i) preliminary flood risk assessment, completed in 
2011; ii) flood hazard maps and flood risk maps for 
flood-prone zones, produced in 2013; iii) flood risk 
management plans, recently completed by the end of 
2015. 
 
 
Figure 1. The implementation steps required by the Floods 
Directive, with relative deadlines. 
2.2 Links with Critical Infrastructure 
Critical Infrastructure (CI) plays a central role in the 
development of the European well-being [25]. It 
represents a consistent part of the built environment, and 
its components can be both concentrated and diffused in 
space. For example, in the electricity sector generation is 
assured by localized power plants and the distribution by 
long range grids. As human settlements are often located 
in flood-prone areas, CI can be threatened by flooding 
events, generating consequences that go beyond the 
flooded regions [26]. 
Several studies have argued that water management 
and land use planning are often separate issues for 
politicians and decision makers [4, 5, 27]. This can 
involve different management strategies and overlapping 
of jurisdiction, as well as to inconsistencies in the 
terminology used [28]. According to Birkmann and Von 
Teichman [29], when climate change scenarios and 
extreme events are considered, the norms for adaptation 
and resilience of CI should be defined and improved. 
This includes better information on multi-dimensional 
vulnerability and capacity mapping that may lead to the 
creation of dynamic vulnerability assessment processes. 
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3 Cascading events, Critical 
Infrastructures and multiple stressors 
In this section, we explain the concept of cascading 
events and derive two vulnerability drivers that could be 
used to test the European Floods Directive: Critical 
Infrastructure and multiple stressors in river systems. 
3.1 Cascading events 
The relevance of cascading events and interconnected 
risks has grown sensibly during the last years. The early 
	 
    	  	 


 activate a series of causal chain effects [30]. 
Other authors (see, as example, [31]) suggested the idea 
that branching tree of emergencies are triggered by a 
primary threat. As an example, the vulnerability of 
society to complex crisis has been highlighted by events 
such as the air transportation shot down triggered by the 
2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajökull and the Fukushima 
meltdown that hit Japan in 2011.  
The increased knowledge of globally networked risks 
and the sensibility of their interdependencies required a 
shift in the paradigm of knowledge [32]. Therefore, 
Pescaroli and Alexander [19] proposed a comprehensive 
approach to cascading events, arguing that they are 
distinguished by the existence of unforeseen and non-
linear paths of subsidiary events (Figure 2). The crisis 
escalates as time progresses, instead of being stabilized 
by the full mobilization of emergency resources, 
spreading towards the vulnerabilities of society and the 
disruption of functional nodes such as CI. Although 
cascading effects are associated with complex chain 
failures in human subsystems, cascading events or 
cascading disasters have a higher level of complexity and 
escalation where the gravity of the secondary crisis tend 
to distinguish it from the primary trigger [19].  
 
Figure 2. a) Linear path of events in disasters and b) non-linear 
path of cascading events (adapted from [19]).  
 
Thus, the application of cascading concept to the 
management of water basins and risk mapping suggested 
the need to shift from hazards assessment to social 
vulnerability assessment [4]. This process has different 
components, and any consideration about multi-hazards 
interactions in management strategies has to join together 
environmental and anthropogenic processes [33]. 
According to Pescaroli and Alexander [23], cascading 
events are manifested as a consequence of vulnerabilities 
accumulated in different scales and systemic levels, such 
as the environment, socio-technological drivers (e.g. 
globalization or local institutions), or interdependent CI 
(Figure 3). Consequently, cascades are more dependent 
by contextual dynamics associated with the pre-existing 
factors and social feedbacks explained in the model 
proposed by Alexander [24].  At the micro-scale, they 
correspond to roots such as corruption, negligence or 
unsafe conditions of production, which become 
unsustainable weaknesses of socio-economic models at 
the macro-scale.  
 
 
Figure 3. Vulnerability path of cascading disasters and cross-
scale interactions (adapted from [23]). 
3.2 Critical Infrastructure 
Critical Infrastructure can be seen as the recurrent 
element where fragilities are accumulated at the micro-
level, activating feedbacks to larger scale and acting as 
systems for their role of functional nodes [23]. Indeed, 
following the Directive on European Critical 
Infrastructures (ECIs) released in 2008, these are defined 

		
	



vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic 
or social well-being of people, and the disruption or 
destruction 			


as a result of the failure to maintain those functions25]. 
According to Hellstrom [34], CI can be seen as 
technological systems that aggregate functions, but also 
vulnerabilities and pressures that could be triggered by 
external hazards. The increase of interconnections among 
sectors raised the likelihood that localized failures or 
disruptions could have dramatic impacts at regional or 
cross-boundary level [35]. Consequently, taken into 
account the unforeseen nature of crises and the very 
complex structures of CI networks, mitigation efforts 
may be inadequate, especially when dealing with the 
cascading effects of crises [36]. Moreover, the adaptation 
process of CI to climate change scenario and to extreme 
events suggest the need of long-term visions that could be 
integrated in better strategies of planning, preparedness 
and damages assessment [29]. 
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3.3 Multiple stressors in river systems  
Anthropogenic interventions have contributed to 
modify several watercourses and floodplains since the 
beginning of the civilization [37, 38]. In Europe, this 
process accelerated over the last decades, with heavy 
consequences for watercourses and their management. 
Nowadays, it has been recognized that natural and 
anthropogenic forcings must be considered together, both 
at the technical and legislative level [4]. This supported 
the creation of a broad framework of norms covering 
different needs and vulnerabilities in the territory. At the 
European level, the first strategy to consider is the Water 
Framework Directive [39], which includes biological, 
hydro-morphological and physico-chemical quality 
elements as a basis to monitor river systems. In addition 
to this law, the European Commission released the 
Floods Directive in 2007 [17, 21]. As described above, 
the main aims of the Directive are the protection and the 
management of the natural/built environment from 
flooding events, considering different types of floods, 
their consequences and the anthropic forcings, as well as 
the handling of risks associated with flooding events. 
4 Case studies  
 The paper analyzes a series of case studies to 
highlight the importance of applying the Floods Directive 
at a sufficiently larger scale [4]. The goal is to provide 
some wider evidences that could support the development 
of new scenarios, but also improve the existing risk and 
vulnerability assessment processes. The methodology 
proposed here is a qualitative comparison of literature, 
including both academics studies and official documents. 
This methodology is based on some assumptions:  
- 	  
  
 
 
according to the definition of Pescaroli and Alexander 
[19], highlighting disaster paths escalated by CI [23]; 
- the events describe the different components of flood 
risk, addressing functional consequences of the 
escalations and possible impacts of the FD, but also 
interconnection among hazards and their chemical or 
biological impact according to current theories [4, 19, 23, 
33]; 
- the time frame is after the introduction of the European 
Water Framework Directive [39], namely happened in the 
last 15 years; 
- the cases span between European Member States, with 
the aim to test the general hypotheses with possible local 
drivers. 
The absence of databases on cascading and the 
emerging literature about this topic have to be considered 
both as a limitation and a potential for future researchers. 
On the one hand, our selection was limited by the scarce 
availability of data, which forced us to considered events 
and scenarios we were aware of, as already happened in 
other studies [4]. On the other hand, scholars could take 
advantages of the status quo and easily improve the state 
of art using our study as base. 
In the next subsections we describe floods in urban 
areas that can threat industries and economic hubs (Paris 
case study), while other events can have a delayed impact 
on different sectors such telecommunications (York case) 
or drinking water supply (Messina event). We also point 
out that floods may acts as mechanisms of direct or 
indirect release of hazardous materials, impacting 
sensible sites such as chemical power plants (Spolana 
case) or waste treatment facilities (Gloucestershire case). 
4.1 Cascading in urban areas: Ile-de-France 
 Our first case study is focused on the analysis of 
urban flooding, which is rooted in more than a century of 
water management policies across Europe.  
The Seine River in the Ile-de-France region (France) 
has been reduced in various stages since 1910, by means 
of the implementation of structural measures such as 
dams, levees and canalization [40]. However, over the 
last decades, the investments have been very limited, and 
now the French protection could be considered below the 
standards of other European countries [40]. The risk 
exposure and the resulting vulnerability are accentuated 
by an increased urban density in the economic centre of 
France, as well as by the development of several activity 
centres and critical infrastructures along the Seine River 
[40]. In particular, the Ile-De-France region (Figure 4b) is 
the second largest economic area in Europe, and 
represents a logistic hub for the whole France, covering 
about one third of the economic activities of the entire 
country.  
 
 
Figure 4. Map of a) France and b) Ile-de-France. 
 
Recently, a report by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development [40] highlights some 
major problems that could emerge in the case of floods. 
The concentration of strategic infrastructures in the area 
could represent an exacerbating factor that has been 
widely pointed out in literature [19, 35]. Indeed, it has 
been estimated that an extreme flooding event (return 
period of more than 100 years) in this area could have 
direct and indirect effects on several millions people and 
manifold industries and facilities. Potentially, it could 
disrupt the functioning of the institutions, as well as most 
of the critical infrastructures essential for the daily life of 
Paris. The distribution of electricity could be largely 
affected, with almost one quarter of power stations 
flooded and more than 1.5 million customers who could 
experience power cuts. The road network could be 
blocked, while drinking water supply may be interrupted 
with more than 5 million citizens suffering of extended 
water cuts and, at least, another 1.3 million a 
deterioration in quality. 
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As visible in Figure 5, produced by the EPTB Seine 
Grands Lacs (the department responsible for water 
management) in 2014, several areas around Paris are 
classified as territory at significant risk of flooding. For 
this reasons and following the requirements of the FD, 
the EPTB has developed the PAPI, which is the 
programme to prevent and manage flooding events, and 
give advice to the involved water authorities to take 
actions in a coordinate and synergic way [41]. 
 
 
Figure 5. Territory subjected to flooding risk in the Ile-de-
France region (source [41]). 
 
Nowadays, there is an on-going momentum on flood 
risk management with the FD implementation: a national 
strategy on the management of flood risks is being 
developed and a priority area for risk management in the 
Ile-de-France region was recently defined, together with a 
governance mechanism for its implementation [40]. 
4.2 Cascading and risk assessment: York 
  barriers were completed in 1987 following 
major flooding happened in 1982. Despite another event 
in 2000, no improvement were adopted and, in 2012, the 
use of four of their eight pumps failed for overheating, 
resulting in flood warnings for hundreds of householders. 
Following those episodes and the UK National strategy, 
the local City Council approved its own flood risk 
management strategy in March 2015 [42]. The document 
included a preliminary risk assessment (PFRA) explicitly 
based on the EU Floods Directive. One of its conclusions 
was that no historical local flood events are considered 
to have had 

 	 
!
 [42]. 
Following this document, flood risk management plans 
had to be prepared by December 2015, but because the 
Council PFRA affirmed that York did not exceed the 
national flooding thresholds, 
 	 
 was 
required in the current cycle[42]. 
However, December 2015 was considered the wettest 
month ever recorder in the UK, with the rain falling 
almost double the average [43]. These precipitations 
triggered several flooding events across the country. Like 
in the past, the town of York was expected to be at risk 
across its entire territory, as reported by the Environment 
Agency in Figure 6b. 
 
 
Figure 6. a) Map of York; b) Flood Risk Maps released by the 
Environment Agency on December 26, 2015. 
 
The failure of some key flood defences in the north of 
Britain questioned the national capacity of coping with 
anomalous events. In several urban areas thousands of 
homes were revealed more at risk than was expected and 
in York the authorities forced the evacuation of thousands 
of citizens. The state of the large-scale defences was 
seriously affected, because pumping equipments were 
overwhelmed by the huge volume of water. Besides the 
coordination efforts related to evacuation and sheltering 
of citizens or the lack of ground transportation (more than 
thirty roads were completely closed), the official timeline 
of events highlighted another clear escalation point for 
operations. Since the evening of December 27 "Flood 
water swamps British Telecommunications (BT) 
exchange, phone internet and many mobile networks fail 
including hospital phones" [44]. The afternoon of 
December 28 the same timeline observed underground 
telephone cables fault affecting 40000 customers [44]. 
On December 29 the authorities suggested that the 
majority of domestic phone lines were restored, but 4000 
customers were still without broadband. In other words, 
thousands of York homes and businesses were left 
without phone and internet services, creating what was 
called  	 
. The problems appeared to have 
impacted banking and payment services in the city, as 
observed by a BT spokesman, whom confirmed that 
phone and broadband services were lost due to severe 
flooding events in the Yorkshire area [45]. 
Although those circumstances may become more 
frequent due to climate change [46, 47], this case study 
verifies the evidences pointed out by Nones and Pescaroli 
[4]: current risk assessment procedures tends to focus 
only on hazards, underestimating the potential of 
cascading effects, despite the effective implementation of 
the advice reported in the FD. Moreover, the event 
described here confirmed the existence of a vulnerability 
path related to the role of CI as functional nodes, which 
trigger an escalation of emergencies, in line with the 
model described by Pescaroli and Alexander [23]. 
4.3 Cascading and mismanagement: Messina 
 In autumn 2015 the southern Italy was affected by 
huge rainfalls, in particular in the northern part of Sicily 
in the provinces of Messina and Catania (Figure 7).  
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 Figure 7. Map of Sicily, with location of Messina and 
Calatabiano. 
 
In October 2015, excessive rains caused river 
overflows in the lowland areas and debris flows and 
landslides in the mountain part of the island [48]. After 
several raining days, on October 24 a landslide damaged 
a water pipe of the Fiumefreddo aqueduct, close to the 
village of Calatabiano, which is the main source of water 
for Messina, delivering about 80% (920 l/s) of the 
drinking water consumed in the city.  
Due to the lack of funds, insecure conditions of the 
impacted site, administrative and logistic delays, Messina 
suffered more than 20 days without drinking water [49]. 
The problem was partially reduced by the small supply 
delivered by tankers and the presence of a few old wells 
in the city. Moreover, schools and public offices were 
closed or disrupted [50], involving maddening 
consequences for the citizens. Besides such problems, 
landslides triggered by floods caused at least 2 billion 
euro of damages in the mountain area. 
The relevance of this case study has to be referred to 
the clear presence of pre-existing factors and social 
feedbacks [24] that generated the vulnerability path of 
cascading [23].  Indeed, Messina has a long tradition of 
lack of drinkable water, which caused the recurrent 
effects of droughts, but also a well-known  
mismanagement of water supply system and control of 
the mountainous areas are clearly recognizable (e.g. [51, 
52]).  
Although the Floods Directive cannot address 
juridical problems, the integration of vulnerability 
assessment procedures would have helped to identify the 
most sensible infrastructures and the possible interactions 
with land use management. This was done only 
marginally in the local civil protection plan [53]. On the 
one hand, it did not consider the risk of concurrence or 
cascades triggered by a primary hazard as defined by Gill 
and Malamud [33]. On the other hand, the document did 
not integrate possible social consequences generated by 
CI disruptions, considering very vaguely only the risk of 
electric black out.    
 
 
4.4 Cascading and chemical escalation: Spolana 
plant and Gloucestershire 
 Natural events may be a powerful and prominent 
mechanism of direct and indirect release of hazardous 
materials [54, 55]. If industrial sites are located in 
naturally hazard-prone areas, technological accidents may 
be triggered by natural happenings, which could generate 
NaTech disasters (Natural events triggering 
Technological Disasters). Such accidents can modify and 
increase the impact and the overall damages in the 
surrounding areas [56, 57, 58, 59]. 
The analysis of NaTech disasters reported in this 
paper is carried out through the consultation of the 
MARS database, which summarises data and information 
on accidents that occurred in process plants and industrial 
sites. The MARS (Major Accident Reporting System) 
database is managed by the Major Accident Hazards 
Bureau at the European Commission Joint Research 
Centre in Ispra, Italy [60]. This repository was 
established to comply with the obligations of Article 19 
of the "-## $ 96/82/EC [61], which 
requires setting up a database in order to record and 
exchange data and information on the accidents that 
occurred in industrial sites. The reports come from the 
competent authorities and are divided in three sections: 
report profile, short report and full report. The report 
profile contains information to identify the event, while 
additional details are described in the other two sections, 
such as causes and circumstances of the accidents, 
evolution and consequences, adopted responses. Short 
reports, which are available to the public and therefore 
analysed in the present paper, summarise the main 
information concerning the accident. Full reports are 
confidential and contain more detailed data about the 
accidents, but they can be provided only after causes, 
evolution and consequences of the accident are fully 
understood [58]. #
%&'	!
	"-
## $ 	 
 
 ( 	 )*+,-
regulations 1999 [62]. The general duty of the COMAH 
regulations is that every operator shall take all measures 
necessary to prevent major accidents and limit their 
consequences to the persons and the environment'
classifying the sites and preparing on-site emergency 
plans.  
In the following sections we present two case studies 
that influenced the early steps of the Floods Directive, 
pointing out possible problems triggered by flooding 
events. We use these case studies to highlight the points 
that are still unsolved in the implementation process.  
4.4.1 Spolana chemical plant 
The Spolana chemical plant is located at Neratovice, 
about 25 km north of Prague, Czech Republic, along the 
Elbe River (Figure 8).  
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Figure 8. Map of the Elbe basin and localization of the Spolana 
plant. 
 
Here, a chlor-alkali plant has been in operation since 
1948 [63]. During the former communist regime, the 
plant produced chlorine and dioxins, creating one of the 
most contaminated places worldwide. Chlorine is a heavy 
gas with a pungent odor, which irritates mucous 
membranes even in small quantities, producing 
headaches, eye irritation and conjunctivitis, congestion of 
the membrane of respiratory organs, persistent cough and 
sharp pains in the breastbone. In greater concentration, 
there is a danger of edema or even death. 
In August 2002, extreme and widespread 
precipitations over the Czech Republic and Eastern 
Germany led to disastrous floods in the catchment areas 
of the upper course of the Elbe River, the tributaries 
Vltava and Mulde [4, 64, 65]. As a consequence of a 
catastrophic flood characterized by a return time period 
of more than one century [66], about 90% of the Spolana 
factory area was flooded up to 3 m, and there was a great 
risk of spreading of highly Hg-contaminated materials 
within the area [55, 63]. In detail, between August 14 and 
August 18 water entered into the plant and inundated the 
emergency retention sumps, in which the liquid chlorine 
storage tanks were located. Therefore, chlorine was 
released into air and water on August 15, 17 and 23 [60]. 
On August 15, the rupture of a pipeline and the 
detachment of parts of a container caused the major 
release of chlorine, involving all the surrounding and 
creating damages to the vegetation and habitat, but, 
fortunately, without any injury to the workforce. It was 
estimated that, in total, more than 80000 tons of chlorine 
was released [60]. 
The measured concentration of several chemicals in 
the soils resulted increased after the flooding event with 
respect to the state before the episode [65, 67], creating 
long-term problems for the habitat and contaminating 
surface watercourses and groundwaters at large scale. In 
addition, the residential area near the chemical plant was 
covered by a toxic cloud for many days. 
4.4.2 Gloucestershire waste treatment facility 
The autumn of 2000 was considered, at that time, the 
wettest for around 270 years over England and Wales 
[68], and the prolonged heavy rainfall caused significant 
river flooding in many regions, such as the 
Gloucestershire (Figure 9a). 
 
Figure 9. a) Map of England with the localization of the 
Gloucestershire; b) rainfall amount over England in autumn 
2000 (source [68]). 
 
These happenings contributed to a major accident that 
occurred at the waste treatment and storage site located in 
Sandhurst, near Gloucester. The site, classified as a 
COMAH lower tier plant, was a licensed waste treatment 
facility and transfer station for a wide range of hazardous 
waste chemical substances. The incident started in the 
early hours of October 30 during a severe storm, which 
triggered a major fire in a waste storage area [60]. 
Around 177 tons of mixed chemicals including 
flammables, toxics (1.1 ton), chlorinated hydrocarbon 
solvents, low-level radiation waste and asbestos were 
consumed by the fire. Fortunately, not all the materials 
involved were dangerous substances as defined in 
COMAH [62]. The fire was restricted to the waste 
transfer area and did not affect the bulk tanks store on 
site.  
Most of the firewater was retained on site by 
containment measures, but a small quantity of polluted 
water escaped, with consequent problems to the 
surroundings. Despite of there were no on-site injuries or 
ill-health problems, numerous reports of illness to local 
residents have been reported after the event, but direct 
links with the incidents remain quite unclear. Several 
surveys and studies were performed in the area affected, 
in order to analyse the effect of the incident on biota and 
vegetation. So far, a few results are available, indicating a 
slight increase of the level of heavy metals in macro-
invertebrates just after the event. No detailed data or 
additional information about the long-term effects of the 
accident on the environment are reported, but the 
Environment Agency is continuing its investigations.  
Notwithstanding of the relatively low impact of this 
event, raised anxiety among residents about chemical 
contamination was a major issue [2]. There was a 
significant off-site concern, with the formation of local 
pressure groups, campaigning primarily to stop the site 
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reopening. This was successful, as the site closed down 
following the incident [60]. 
5 Discussion 
Our case studies provided a range of evidences from 
different cultural and social contexts. What emerges is a 
wide picture of the vulnerability path of cascading events, 
in line with the theory of Pescaroli and Alexander [23]. 
According to our results, the failure of CI and its 
technological components can escalate the events 
categorized in four interacting areas of sensibility (Figure 
10): 
- vulnerability of network. The functional vulnerability of 
heavily networked urban life to CI disruption can threat 
the functioning of manifold activities and delayed 
problems for citizens not directly affected by floods. The 
escalation process starts involving the area directly 
impacted by water, which amplifies at the regional and 
cross-border level. An exemplar case is the economic 
region Ile-de-France, which is based on deeply 
interconnected functions at high risk of flooding [69]; 
- vulnerability of society. The interdependencies of the 
built environment and vital functions suggest that 
traditional risk assessment process is, generally, not 
enough. The evidence is particularly clear in the York 
case study, where it is possible to notice the failure of a 
strategy approved in the very same year of the event [42]; 
- vulnerability to interactions among environmental and 
human systems. This vulnerability is shown in the 
Messina case, where the mismanagement and the raise of 
anthropic pressures increase the likelihood of chain 
effects among hazard [33]. When it clashed with the 
rigidities accumulated in CI, like the lack of 
preparedness, a full cascade escalated in society [23]; 
- vulnerability to NaTech escalation. Flooding events on 
industrial sites located in naturally hazard-prone areas 
may be powerful triggers for technological accidents, 
modifying and increasing consequences and damages in 
the surrounding areas [56, 57]. 
 
 
Figure 10. Interacting dimensions of vulnerability, CI and 
feedback loops in Cascading Disasters triggered by floods. 
 
Those dimensions are probably not exhaustive and 
they are likely to be conditioned by the limited 
information available. However, they seem to confirm 
that the FD is missing to address the potential escalation 
of events that characterize cascading disasters. In fact, in 
every case described we notice the existence of feedback 
loops that could represent the root of cascading paths, but 
could also be a way to tackle them [23]. Therefore, we 
may argue that vulnerability can be reduced by: i) the use 
of normative power, intended as a way to modify the 
status quo; ii) the management, intended as a better 
planning and the improvement of lessons learned [24]. 
Recently, it has been shown that the FD seems to be 
missing to integrate the impact of cascading effects when 
they involve larger spatial and temporal scales [4]. In the 
case of cascading disasters, this is likely to be even more 
critical because the escalation process becomes stronger. 
As reported in Figure 11, flooding events in the Directive 
are associated with the primary impact of triggers, giving 
less attention to secondary effects and escalation 
processes. To tackle the challenges determined by cross-
temporal and spatial scales of cascading paths, the 
diversification of efforts made by the water authorities in 
charge could be determinant.  
The FD could benefit of integrating vulnerability 
scenario building instead of just being focused on risk 
and hazard scenarios, according with the theory of the 
vulnerability path [23]. This may be done in different 
ways. Firstly, new assessment methodologies should 
integrate together social, physical and structural drivers, 
taking as reference, respectively, the community, the 
environment and the buildings in defining the sensibility 
of areas to flood-triggered cascading. Secondly, GIS 
databases could be used to combine the likelihood of 
interactions among different hazards with variables such 
as the development of strategic land use planning or the 
level of maintenance and preparedness of CI. Finally, the 
presence of infrastructural nodes should take more 
relevance and be contextualized in their social, economic 
and ecological contexts. This may provide a better 
perspective on NaTech escalation, which is likely to have 
a more impact in areas of high pre-impact vulnerability.   
 
 
Figure 11. EU Floods Directive: from risk scenario to 
vulnerability scenario. 
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6 Conclusions 
In the paper we verified that the Floods Directive is 
missing to address the potential escalation of events that 
distinguishes cascading disasters. We pointed out the 
open challenges associated with cascading disasters and 
cross-scales interactions, on the basis of case studies 
chosen according to the standards suggested by King et 
al. [70], in order to guarantee replicability in future 
researches. 
The analyses of these cases addressed different forms 
of escalation process, which could be ascribed at the 
European level with improvements in the frame of the 
EU Floods Directive. Our review suggests some priority 
areas where additional effort is necessary to fill the 
existing gaps: i) scientific limitations can generate high 
uncertainty or non-availability of data on the long-term 
impact of flooding events, especially when social 
vulnerability is implicated; ii) spatial and temporal scales 
result difficult to determine when trigger hazards cause 
the disruption of interconnected infrastructures; iii) the 
strong interdependence of natural/built environment and 
human pressures requires to improve the evaluation of 
risk scenarios; iv) floods management needs the 
consideration of secondary and indirect effects, which are 
generally underestimated by policy makers and water 
managers;  v) the training of adequate experts able to 
provide new categories of information should be 
considered; vi) the integration of vulnerability scenario 
should account for different contextual drivers,  
becoming a new tool used by normative power and  
management to address the escalation process.   
To sum up, we can argue that the Floods Directive 
should include a higher balance between the evaluation of 
hazards and the management of vulnerability scenarios, 
with the aim to provide better advice to water managers 
in addressing the coordination challenges that could arise 
in the case of cross-scale crisis where cascades are 
diffused. Future flood risk management plans could 
integrate the impact of flooding events at larger spatial 
and temporal scales, considering all the possible cross-
time and cross-scale challenges that can arise from 
flooding events. A better integration of common 
standards used for vulnerability assessment process in the 
Floods Directive implementation seems necessary, in 
particular on the basis of some priorities: i) use of maps 
and rankings that include CI interdependencies; ii) 
consideration of stressors that could amplify the impact 
of the events including social and environmental 
vulnerabilities; iii) attention on economic drivers and 
environmental features that could generate cross-scale 
escalation.   
This paper represents a preliminary overview on the 
relationship between cascading events and Floods 
Directive, therefore it is not pretended to be exhaustive. 
Further research is needed to define how and in which 
form a better understanding of vulnerabilities can 
improve the effectiveness of mitigation measures and 
preparedness practices. The work for a better integration 
of cascading paths in the present legislation is just begun. 
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